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The paper initially discusses monetary policies in the context of the wide
margins introduced on 1 August 1993. The new President of the European
Monetary Institute (EMI) has suggested that a number of stringent non-
monetary conditions must be met before there can be a return to narrow
margins. While this list may be too comprehensive, the paper argues that there
are also some monetary prerequisites which will be difficult to meet: at a
minimum some mixture of less conditionality in interventions on behalf of
creditor central banks and strong incentives for debtor central banks to raise
interest rates to defend their currencies. The paper finds a continuation of wide
margins for most of the transition realistic. Such a scenario might have certain
advantages in relation to the transition to monetary union, provided participants
continue to value exchange rate stability highly.
In the second part the specific role of the EMI is reviewed. To the extent
that the EMI President, the Director-General and other senior members of the
staff succeed in taking charge of the work in the Council, The Alternates'
Committee and the various writing groups monetary coordination and the
preparations for full monetary union should be enhanced. The latter would also
be helped if the EMI were to be given some operational functions beyond the
passive holding and managing of international reserves specifically mentioned
in the Treaty. An operational role also in domestic money market operations
and in clearing in the ecu market appears desirable.
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When the subject of the present paper was agreed with the organisers
of the conference early in 1993 the choice seemed reasonable and not
excessively demanding. Following the expected ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty in the course of the summer and autumn of 1993
by the three laggards - Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany -
stage two would, by November 1993, be imminent with its
intentions of reinforced budgetary convergence through the rules of
the Treaty and of tighter monetary coordination assisted by the start
of the European Monetary Institute (EMI). A paper under the
proposed title would have focused not least on how the EMI might
reinforce application of the extensive rule book of the European
Monetary System (EMS) as it then existed.
Maastricht was duly ratified by Denmark in May and by the two final
EC Member States in the course of recent months as challenges to the
legality of ratification were defeated by the respective national courts
in the United Kingdom and Germany. Nevertheless, the whole
process left little of the momentum which initially inspired the project
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the accompanying
effort to deepen political integration. As far as the EMU process is
concerned, the final destination was always much more clearly
perceived than the transition. The partial suspension of the EMS on
1 August 1993 sharpens this distinction further, since the transition
can not any longer be perceived to proceed almost linearly from
stage one through the transitional stage two to the final locking of
exchange rates and the introduction of the single currency. The rule
1book has to be partly rewritten and new interpretations must be given
to formulations in the Treaty which had earlier seemed straightfor-
ward.
The decisions taken by the European Council in Brussels at the end
of October 1993 to locate the EMI in Frankfurt and to designate
Professor Alexandre Lamfalussy as its first President, important as
they are, do not help much to see where the EMU process is heading.
The current trend, particularly among German policy-makers, is one
of demanding maximalist prerequisites for entering full EMU, notably
through a rigorous interpretation of the budgetary convergence
criteria, combined with a minimalist interpretation of the functions of
the new EMI. This is a potentially inconsistent mixture, unlikely to
lead to EMU within any time frame. It is particularly urgent to
discuss the pros and cons of a return to the narrow margins EMS and
the reinforcement required to make a revived EMS more robust.
The present paper focuses next on the role(s) of the EMI. The author
does retain a certain nostalgia for the early preparatory work on EMU
when it was still possible to entertain bold ideas on some genuine
pooling of monetary authority during the transition. But one now has
to approach the latter subject by asking in a fairly pedestrian way
what the EMI could realistically do within the Articles of the
Maastricht Treaty and the associated Protocol on the Statute of the
EMI, while keeping in mind the inauspicious starting point of the
wider fluctuation margins in a somewhat discredited EMS.
2The discussion in the rest of the paper is organized in two main
sections. A crucial question for stage two is whether and how a return
to a narrow margins EMS can be managed within a reasonable time
frame, say for the end of 1994. This is the subject of section II,
which starts from a cautious recent statement by the new EMI
President. The section ends with a brief discussion of the reorientation
of the EMIs tasks in case the wide margins are preserved which may
currently appear to be the more likely prospect. Section III turns to
the working methods of the new institution and to the more specific
items on the EMI agenda as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty and the
associated Protocol on the EMI Statute. A few tentative conclusions
are offered in the final section IV.
3II. Monetary coordination in stage two: a return to the narrow
margins ?
When the widening of the margins of fluctuations was decided in the
ECOFIN Council on 1 August, several governments made statements
to the effect that the arrangement was temporary and that a return to
the traditional narrow margins should be envisaged by the end of
1993 or in the course of 1994. Some governments showed disappoint-
ment that their currency had not been in a position to adopt a "Dutch
solution", i.e. sticking to the ±2 1/4% margins against the DM.
Subsequently little has been heard about any early return to narrow
margins and the current mood, exemplified in the new EMI Presid-
ent's first public statement, appears to be to pour cold water on the
notion:
2
"Firstly, I am not sure that simply a return to the pre-1992
ERM can be regarded as a realistic objective. Secondly, I am
sure that it would not be advisable to set any precise timetable
for re-establishing a more constraining exchange rate mecha-
nism. Such a move should be dependent on a number of
desirable developments: a better business cycle situation;
renewed progress towards broadly-based convergence; the
restoration of the credibility of the policies of the Member
States, and, last but not least, fiscal policies which give support
to, rather than hinder, stability-oriented monetary policies."
2 Lamfalussy (1993), reply to question 5 from the European Parliament
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The question was: "In
which way can the EMI contribute to the recovery of monetary stability,
and, in that context, can the EMS be restored without adaptations ?"
4This is a rather forbidding list of conditions for reestablishing
anything like the old EMS. It is also noteworthy that the list contains
exclusively non-monetary conditions and, in particular, no hint of
what would be required in terms of revisions of the EMS rules
themselves to make a return to narrow margins feasible. Essentially,
the EMI President appears to imply that no conceivable revision of
the rules could substitute for any of the non-monetary prerequisites
listed. While his statement is no doubt a loyal reflection of current
attitudes in the EMS central banks to warn the political authorities
against the idea that "monetary gimmicks" can paper over significant
policy differences between countries, the list appears too critical of
current performance and incomplete by its omission of any references
to the EMS itself.
The EMI President is too critical in giving no credit to the high
degree of convergence with respect to several of the Maastricht
criteria which is already observable, or likely to become so, notably
with respect to inflation and long-term interest rates.
3 Convergence
in these nominal respects will be difficult to improve under any
conceivable circumstances, once the German inflation rate edges down
into the 2-3 % interval (for consumer prices) which it should reach in
the course of 1994. Budget deficits are currently on average more
than twice the reference value of 3 % to be aimed for according to the
Maastricht Treaty, but the dispersion around this average has become
smaller, as some of the countries which had some room for
manoeuvre left have allowed some cyclical increase in the deficit,
while taking also modest discretionary actions to stimulate their
3 See figure 1 in Daniel Gros' comment, this volume.
5economies (France, Denmark). Since all countries are faced with the
same unfavourable recessionary trends and most of them have broadly
similar budget deficits due to a common cyclical component, it is not
clear why monetary policies have to be so different as to rule out a
tight exchange rate arrangement between them. The competitive
positions inside the European Community are generally seen by both
officials and independent analysts as being near equilibrium levels and
external imbalances are generally modest. The confirmation of past
central rates on 1 August was another indication that these rates are
broadly in line with economic fundamentals.
Even if one grants that the above list of reasoning softens the stringent
non-monetary requirements of Mr. Lamfalussy for recreating the
previous EMS or something close to it, the question remains whether
the EMS rules themselves need to be rewritten or simply adhered to
more rigidly. The central banks and the EMI will have to address this
question and in a more precise way than was done in the two official
reports prepared in April 1993 to draw the lessons of the currency
turmoil of 1992-93.
4 Putting the responsibility for restoring the
previous EMS - of which all participants were proclaimed supporters
prior to the August relaxation - solely on factors beyond their own
control will not suffice. In order to begin such a discussion, an
autopsy first has to be performed on the narrow margins EMS.
The rule book of the defunct EMS was the so-called Basle-Nyborg
4 Committee of Governors (1993) and Monetary Committee (1993).
6Agreement of 1987.
5 This agreement was negotiated as a response to
the speculative attacks which had triggered a realignment in January
1987 at a time when economic fundamentals did not suggest a need
for a realignment. The Basle-Nyborg Agreement made explicit an
emerging consensus among the central bankers which survived
virtually intact for more than five years. The EMS was to be
defended, in a world of increasing capital mobility, by a mixture of
three mechanisms. Although the precise application of them was not
spelt out in the agreement itself, subsequent practice justifies the
following summary description: first, currencies should be allowed to
move inside the margins in response to market pressures. Second, if
this first buffer had proved inadequate, interventions could be used to
stem undesirably strong fluctuations; for that purpose the use of the
Very Short-Term Financing Facility was made more easily accessible
to debtors wishing to intervene intramarginally. The credit period was
also extended (from 2½ to 3½ months) in order to ease the problems
for debtors of creating a reflow into their currency sufficient to settle
the intervention debt incurred vis-å-vis the issuers of a strong
currency. Third, if tension persisted with interventions reaching large
figures, short-term interest rate differentials should be adjusted to
make future interventions unnecessary - or at least small.
6
5 Press Communiqué of the Committee of Governors of 18 September
1987, reprinted in Gros and Thygesen (1992), p. 99.
6 This interpretation of the sequencing of the defensive mechanisms may
not be shared by all officials. The Bundesbank, followed by some smaller
Northern central banks, has tended to emphasize a rapid escalation all the
way to interest rate adjustments, possibly skipping interventions
altogether, or using them primarily to bolster changes in interest rates.
7If these three defensive mechanisms did not abate the tensions, a
realignment would be resorted to, though this final point is not
mentioned in the official text from 1987 which is in itself significant
in view of the emphasis on realignments in the 1993 official reports.
In 1987 the central bankers were anxious to be seen to regard
realignments as a last resort and certainly not as a pre-emptive
weapon. Since the general consensus was that the latest realignment
of January 1987 had been superfluous, it seemed desirable to stress
that the central rates should only move in truly exceptional
circumstances.
Several policy-makers commented on the Basle-Nyborg Agreement by
explaining that, if a realignment had become inevitable, it should be
sufficiently small to permit continuity of market exchange rates. This
implied that realignments should at a maximum be within twice the
width of the margins then in existence - or 4-4½% for most of the
participants - assuming that weak and strong currencies switched
places inside the margins at the time of realignment. Such a switch
could be encouraged by an appropriate management of short-term
interest rates; in other words the central bank of a devalued currency
should not rush into a lowering of interest rates. Avoiding jumps in
market exchange rates was seen as strategically important in deterring
future speculative attacks, since no immediate gains would then be
made by market participants from taking open positions. Indeed,
speculators would lose since they would be incurring abnormally high
borrowing costs in the currencies in which they had gone short.
8For a long time the provisions of Basle-Nyborg worked remarkably
well. They were put to a severe test already in early November 1987
when, after the crash in the New York Stock Exchange, the US dollar
fell and created asymmetric movements of EMS currencies. Following
significant intramarginal interventions Germany and France moved
interest rates temporarily in opposite directions which effectively
checked speculation in a realignment.
7 The Basle-Nyborg Agreement
also survived without major conflicts the removal of residual capital
controls in eight EC countries in the 1988-90 period, the entry of two
major additional currencies (peseta and sterling), the narrowing of the
margins for the lira in January 1990 and the entry of the escudo in
April 1992. In retrospect, it is impressive that a simple rule book
could suffice to keep the EMS together for more than five years. A
careful analysis of how tensions were contained in several episodes
would be instructive to undertake in order to modify the present
excessively critical evaluation in official circles and in the public
debate of the EMS based on its final year of existence.
By the late summer of 1992 the Basle-Nyborg Agreement with its
carefully graduated responses to tensions did become inoperative, as
its basis premises were violated one by one. Fluctuations inside the
margins did not provide the intended useful initial buffer mechanism,
since markets began to interpret movements of some currencies
towards or to the bottom of the margins as a sign of impending
realignment rather than as an event increasing the likelihood of future
appreciation back towards the centre of the margins. Rather than
It was disappointing that no similar effort was made in somewhat
analogous circumstances in 1993.
9obviating the need for intervention, movements in the band tended to
increase their size. Interventions came to be relied on too heavily,
particularly since both strong and weak currency countries were
anxious to protect their domestic financial markets against the impact
of external flows. In short, both groups of countries largely sterilized
their interventions. As is well known, the more complete is the degree
of sterilization, the more the need for interventions is perpetuated, and
the more countries will try to shift the burden of intervening to the
partner country at the opposite side of the margins. Given the need to
repurchase a "weak" currency from the central bank of the "strong"
currency within a short span of months, even when the latter was
extended to 3
l/2 months by the Basle-Nyborg Agreement, the spirit of
the agreement was violated by the build-up of such massive
requirements for subsequent settlements that the necessary reversal of
private capital flows began to look improbable. Anyway, by
September 1992 the interventions by the Bundesbank to support the
lira had become so large that the Bundesbank invoked its 1978
understanding with the German government - not unknown to the
EMS partners, though largely forgotten after nearly 14 years of
desuetude - that the presumed mandatory interventions at the margins
could be suspended if they began to threaten domestic monetary
stability.
In September 1992 an important reason why the escalation from
interventions to adjustment of short-term interest-rate differentials did
not work was that the two countries with currencies under attack -
10Italy and the United Kingdom - found it technically difficult
8 and
potentially counterproductive to raise the rates in order to defend the
currency. The rapid spill-over of defensive hikes in short-term interest
rates to long-term rates on government bonds (Italy) and mortgage
rates (the United Kingdom) weakened the resolve of these two
countries to follow the Basle-Nyborg guidelines. In Italy, determined
action along these lines would have aggravated the budget deficit
which was the major source of lack of confidence in the currency. In
the United Kingdom higher mortgage rates would have sapped the
political will to continue in the EMS and, in the view of some UK
observers, might have made ratification of the Maastricht Treaty -
however tenuous the link between the two issues - impossible.
To make the picture of the violations of the EMS procedures
complete, the first realignment tried in practice -the 7% devaluation
of the lira against all other EMS currencies - was much larger than
twice the width of the margins and still considered inadequate by the
market participants who had identified a more substantial
overvaluation of the lira. The sizeable gains made by speculators, and
the prospect of more to come in the shape of further jumps in the lira
or other currencies, created an explosive mixture, prompting a few
days later the exit of sterling and the lira. These events in turn
triggered a series of sizeable realignments inside the EMS, lasting
until May 1993, because the competitive positions of the remaining
participants had weakened and because speculators had "tasted blood".
8 The UK authorities point to problems inherent in their techniques of
monetary management which dampen the liquidity effects of foreign
exchange interventions; the UK money supply showed few traces of the
major outflow of reserves.
11It can be argued that the EMS had by 1992 become indefensible by
means of the combination of instruments available. According to this
view distortions in relative prices had built up over the five years
since the previous realignment while inflation rates had not yet
converged enough to justify rigid nominal exchange rates. The EMS
authorities were in 1992 committing the classical error in managing
the exchange rate system, viz. to try to defend basically misaligned
rates, an error which market participants can spot and force to be
corrected.
It is more puzzling why speculative attacks continued for another ten
months after the more obvious misalignments had been corrected. As
far as the ultimate crisis in the EMS which led to the major relaxation
of the margins on August 1 is concerned, it would appear that the
error was the opposite of that of September 1992, viz. to fail to
defend a constellation of exchange rates which was not in any obvious
way out of line with fundamentals. In such a context it is necessary
to ask what would have had to be changed in the EMS rule book in
order for the system to have survived. The answer to this question is
basically the same as that to the question of what would need to be
changed or reinforced in the EMS in order to make a return to narrow
margins viable.
The autopsy performed on the EMS suggests that two modifications
would have been required, cet.par.. for the survival of the system or
for the reintroduction of narrow margins: a declared readiness to take
on unlimited interventions by creditors and early escalation to changes
in short-term interest rate differentials to ensure that interventions
12would not, in fact, have to be enormous. Neither one of these
modifications appears fully adequate in itself, although making the
intervention obligations of the creditors more explicitly unlimited
would in itself have helped to reduce their actual size; some
combination may have to be aimed for. Put in other words: some
form of monitored unsterilized intervention has to be practiced by
both weak and strong countries. Is it possible to be more specific as
to the provision required ?
A restatement of the obligation to intervene without limits could be
seen as a major favour to the weaker participants, since they can by
themselves only undertake to defend their currency by means of the
international reserves they own or can mobilise at the short notice
required. While these resources can be substantial, the experience of
1992-93 has been that even a well-endowed central bank (Italy, Spain,
France, and - outside the EMS - Sweden), could lose an unacceptably
large part of their owned and borrowed reserves during a speculative
attack. While the EMS rules of intervention are in form symmetrical,
in practice the reserve constraint assures that it works asymmetrically.
This situation is somewhat eased by the shortness of the credit period
of the Very Short-Term Financing Facility which was designed to
reverse early on the liquidity impact of the interventions by the
creditor central bank(s) by offering a firm commitment from the
debtors to repurchase their own currency accumulated by the creditor
within a fairly short period of time. This arrangement was not
sufficiently robust in view of the recent size of private capital flows
which sapped both the Bundesbank's willingness to undertake in
principle unlimited commitments for even the short period required
13and the capacity of the debtors to withstand.
If a narrow margins EMS is to be restored - without there being any
assurance that central rates can not change - a different package of
commitments and obligations would seem necessary for the restoration
of credibility. Just before the turmoil of the past summer, a study
group set up by the European Parliament outlined a possible package
of such commitments and obligations designed to improve the
robustness of the EMS.
9 On the one hand it was proposed to remove
the obligation for debtors to repurchase their own currencies, or at
least to extend the credit period substantially, possibly to the start of
final EMU. Leaving the reform at that might well have eased the
concerns of the debtors and of market participants, but the creditor
central banks would have been justified in regarding the proposal as
a recipe for full loss of monetary autonomy not only in the short, but
also in the longer run. The reform would certainly imply that it would
become impossible for a creditor central bank to insulate through
sterilization its domestic financial market from the impact of the
interventions.
It was therefore suggested to balance the first proposal with a second
one to assume that the debtors do not abuse the greater freedom
which a confirmation of the intervention obligations and the
lengthening of the credit period would imply. This could be dome
through a provision that a country which had lost a large amount of
international reserves by its own and partner interventions - for
9 Collignon et al. (1993). The two proposals referred to in the text are due
to Peter Bofinger and Graham Bishop respectively.
14example corresponding to some percentage of its broad money supply,
say 10 or 15% - would also lose its monetary autonomy. If a country
passes the chosen threshold, the creditors would take over, raise
interest rates in the debtor country or take other measures to restore
confidence in the weak currency. Such a prospect would give the
debtor a strong incentive to take action early of the type that might be
forced upon him later. This second proposal will be regarded as
appealing by those monetary authorities who see themselves inherently
in the role of creditors, but it might still be insufficient to lay at rest
their apprehensions about the first proposal. Anyway, the prospect of
assuming responsibility for another country's monetary policy is not
inviting and would be burdensome and conflictual as long as political
integration is not more fully developed.
Both proposals were intended to oblige the participants in a narrdw
margins arrangement to make their domestic financial markets reflect
external pressures on their currencies. The first makes sterilization
more difficult for the creditors, the second pushes the debtors into a
more rapid escalation of the defensive mechanisms of Basle-Nyborg
towards the use of what was always regarded as the main weapon,
higher short-term interest rates. As a package it had a certain logic
making it a possible candidate for EMS reforms prior to August 1993.
Given the present climate of reluctance to intervene which was the
main inspiration behind the relaxation of the margins, and the
evidently jealous efforts to retain monetary sovereignty during stage
two, the prospect for implementing anything like the two proposals
now appear dim for quite some time.
15"T
The EMS could be regarded as a skillful compromise between rules
and discretion. The rules defined the central rates, the intervention
obligations, settlement procedures and the normal conduct in crisis in
the form of the Basle-Nyborg Agreement; the latter left some room
for discretion, notably about who was to adjust to whom. On 1
August much of the rule book disappeared or became inoperative;
what remains is a largely discretionary system. A return to narrow
margins reinforced along the lines suggested would bring back an
enlarged rule book, and reestablish the old balance between rules and
discretion. Something like that would probably be required as a
monetary prerequisite for reentering the narrow margins.
At the same time the countries reentering narrow margins should at
a minimum refrain from any statement that realignments were still
considered an instrument and, even more so from repeating the notion
in the April 1993 official reports that realignments should be used
more flexibly and ahead of market expectations of such actions. By
emphasizing flexibility in the EMS in the form of realignments, the
officials stacked the cards against their own efforts to maintain the
narrow margins EMS. If there is to be a return of a significant
number of currencies to the narrow margins - at a minimum of the
seven which were in the narrow margins before August, preferably
also of the two Iberian currencies and of some of the currencies of the
applicants for EC membership when their entry into the European
Union occurs in 1995 - it should be made clear that the revived
system is only open to those countries that have no intention of
undertaking realignments during the rest of the transition to EMU.
16The argument of this part of the paper is, in short, that there are also
monetary prerequisites for returning to narrow margins EMS. Fewer
reservations by creditors as to interventions combined with stronger
mechanisms to restrain debtors in their use of the automatic facilities
would be an economically sound approach to a revival of a system,
provided pretentions to retain flexibility in the core of the system, the
central rates, were suppressed.
The present paper shares the first point of the EMI President's
statement reported at the start of this section. It could not be regarded .
as a realistic objective simply to return to the pre-1992 EMS; some
reinforcements are needed even if the non-monetary conditions are
broadly right. The EMI Council and its President face an important
task in clarifying how such reinforcements would be designed in
detail. If the reinforcements are impressive, they might possibly
substitute for some of the very stringent non-monetary prerequisites
for reviving the EMS listed by Professor Lamfalussy. The EMI would
itself have an essential role in monitoring any remaining rules in the
EMS and as an arbiter in the discussion of how discretion is to be
used inside the rules at any time. If a revised system were to go as far
as envisaging more direct interventions into the monetary policy of a
debtor country, the EMI, or more precisely the qualified majority of
9 out of 13 members of its Council, would be a more natural executor
of the appropriate recommendations and actions than one or more
creditor central banks.
It is impossible at the present time to asses whether a narrow margins
EMS could be restored - reinforced or not - within a reasonably close
17" ••..•• • V
time span, say by the end of 1994 or so. The option deserves careful
study, both by the EMI and by the national monetary authorities. Its
potential use can not simply be made to depend on developments in
other areas. It is also important to examine the option in the
perspective of EMU; the absence of references to the final stage of
EMU in official statements since mid-1992 has been remarkable, but
with Maastricht ratified, and the EMI about to start this can no longer
be postponed.
Whether the EC Member States do return to the narrow margins will
also be highly relevant to that part of the EMI's agenda which deals
with issues other than the preparation for the joint policy in stage
three.
1
0 This is the subject of the following section. But before
turning to that it is appropriate to reflect in general on the nature of
a wide margins EMI and its implications for the EMU process.
The ECOFIN Council on 1 August wisely decided to retain the
central rates and not simply to suspend the EMS. The main
implications of the wide margins is to take away for a lengthy period
the obsession in financial markets with the perceived need for
changing the central rates in order to accommodate temporarily a
more differentiated interest rate policies among the participants.
Moderate interest rate cuts in those countries where there is a need to
ease borrowing costs in the late stages of the recession no longer
1
0 This paper does not consider intermediate options between the present
system and a return to something like the previous ±2 1/4 % (though those
margins were arbitrary), since conceivable intermediate options would
only confer benefits if countries embarked on a more divergent course
than seems likely today.
18endangers the credibility of the central rates. One may put the point
differently: while market participants may well have accepted even
before August that central rates were appropriate from the viewpoint
of longer-term fundamentals (which anyway are of less interest to
investors with a fairly short time horizon) this was overshadowed by
a lack of credibility for the short-term interest rate policies required
to sustain the parity grid with narrow margins and this in turn made
the central rates look unsustainable. In the present more relaxed
atmosphere the underlying credibility of the central rates is reappear-
ing; interest rate cuts still tend to weaken currencies though only
marginally, but anticipations of a reversal towards the centre of the
margins sustain capital flows into the weakened currency and limit
depreciation. Indeed, after the weakening in the early weeks of the
new system currencies have stabilized at levels not substantially
different from the levels observed before August.
1
1 If one assumes
that the positive scenario outlined above prevails, exchange rates
would not necessarily move much more during 1994. This is, of
course, conditional on the persistence of fear by the monetary
authorities of testing markets aggressively and on their perception that
such behaviour might jeopardize any prospect of a return to narrow
margins - an option they like to retain, even if they in the end do not
exercise it.
In this positive scenario Member States will retain the option of
reviving the narrow margins, but they may begin to feel so
1
1 By late December 1993 the Belgian and French francs had returned to
their pre-August EMS margins, while the Danish krone was only
marginally below it.
19comfortable with the wide margins that they feel little incentive to go
back to narrow margins. Discussions at the national level will come
to focus increasingly on how to facilitate the preservation of low and
stable inflation rates through domestic policy, notably targets for
monetary aggregates and/or nominal income. Discussions in the EMI
will focus on the compatibility of these national objectives, the
convergence of long-term interest rates and the implications for
exchange-rate stability, while the monitoring of interventions,
sterilization and linkages between short-term interest rates will fade
more into the background. There will be much to do for the EMI and
no need to stop regarding the nine participants in the EMS as a group
of countries with cohesion (as seems to be the current trend in some
recent reports by private financial institutions or international
organizations such as the IMF).
The wide margins may also bring the two currencies which left the
EMS in September 1992 closer to those which still have a central
rate. Policy discussion in the United Kingdom in particular, but also
in Italy, runs more parallel to that in the EMS countries after 1
August than during the 10-11 months preceding that when most of the
EMS countries focused narrowly on their links to German short-term
interest rates. The costs to the two floaters of joining the wide
margins must now seem negligible, but of course the benefits in terms
of credibility effects of joining the present system must also be seen
as modest. But at least the present system offers a better prospect for
dispassionate discussion of an eventual reentry of sterling and of the
lira with central rates that did the narrow margins EMS. For both, of
course, reentry requires a careful evaluation with their partners of the
20central rate to be chosen.
Some observers obviously believe that a resumption of the EMU
process obliges the EMS participants to return to narrow margins.
The Maastricht Treaty sets (Art. 109 j) as one of the entry
requirements to the final stage of EMU that a Member State, in order
to qualify, should meet the criterion that it has observed
"... the normal fluctuations margins provided for by the
exchange rate mechanism of the EMS for at least two years




This may appear at a superficial reading to require those countries
which want to qualify for full EMU when the first effort has to be
made to examine whether a majority of EC Member States is ready
(before the end of 1996) to reenter the 2VA % margins before the end
of 1994.
This, fortunately, appears to be a misinterpretation. The decision of
the ECOFIN Council to widen margins to ±15% could be seen to
have made the latter the "normal" margins.
1
3 According to this
1
2 Similar wording is used in the separate Protocol on the convergence
criteria (Art. 3); this Article adds the proviso that management of the
currency should have been "without tensions".
1
3 The fact that the DM and the guilder have preserved their previous
narrow margins by a separate bilateral arrangement does not modify this
conclusion. This example may, however, offer a hint of what may be
attempted by some other EMS countries in the course of 1994-95.
21interpretation the 1 August decision has opened the option that
Member States, when a majority of them have maintained their
central rates in the wide margins without tensions for two years -
which should be much easier than performing this act in the narrow
margins - may proceed directly from the wide margins to the
permanent locking of exchange rates at the beginning of the third and
final stage. Such a qualitative jump would no doubt require that the
prospective participants in full EMU - of which there would have to
be at least six
1
4 - had in fact seen their currencies stabilize to such
an extent that only a minor part of the scope for fluctuations available
in the wide margins had been used.
The notion that EMS participants could move straight to monetary
union from a system which is presently regarded as dangerously loose
may seem farfetched. The point made here is simply that there is no
formal obligation to return to narrow margins for the EMU process
to resume. Substance, i.e. de facto convergence and exchange rate
stability is, in this case, more important and impressive than form.
It is important to pay attention to this second road to EMU. Some
countries may be positively interested in it, while others may accept
is as a second best. This approach would make the road to EMU
easier because it appears to get around two potentially destabilizing
features of the Maastricht Treaty. Had the narrow margins still been
in existence, 1994 would have been the last date for sneaking in a
1
4 In view of the UK and Danish opt-outs from the final stage, these
countries would not participate in the vote, hence the majority drops to
six.
22devaluation while retaining the credentials to qualify for the final
stage by late 1996. The narrow margins would also have left a
residual risk of a jump in exchange rates at the very end of stage two
at the time of choosing the conversion rates to be used for the locking
of exchange rates. Though such last minute realignments never looked
probable, they were, unfortunately, not explicitly ruled out in the
Treaty. If wide margins continue in existence right through stage two,
the transition to the final stage could appear less risky from this
perspective. Some currencies may at that time have stabilized inside
the margins at a rate which does not coincide closely with the central
rate. If so, markets will anticipate that a recent average of market
rates will be chosen for the conversion, enabling the start of the final




In short, continuing with the wide margins throughout stage two can
not be met with the objection that they are thereby blocking any
advance towards EMU. Nor could it be maintained that this approach
is entirely without advantages. Going back to narrow margins remains
the main approach to EMU, but it is not the only one.
III. The agenda of the EMI.
The present section will look briefly at the tasks confronting the EMI
and at the ways in which the new institution with its Council and
1
5 In this situation it might be useful if the ECOFIN Council were to
announce some time, say six months, in advance of the starting date of
the final stage what rates would be used for conversion to smoothen the
transition further. I owe this point to Peter Kenen.
23President will operate differently from the procedures of the
Committee of Governors which has been in charge of monetary
coordination and the planning of EMU during stage one, lasting from
mid-1990 to the end of 1993.
The section begins with an evaluation of the significance for the
EMI's work of its institutional separateness, the autonomy of its
Council and the greater centralization of initiative and monitoring in
the new body. It then turns to the implications of the provisions in the
EMI Statute that the new body may hold and manage foreign
exchange reserves for the individual central banks, asking whether
other operational tasks might be transferred to it. The section further
discusses whether the EMI's role in facilitating the use of the ecu
might take on increasing significance. Finally, the EMI's forward-
looking tasks to prepare for the joint monetary policy in stage three
needs to be evaluated also in the perspective of its feed-back on
current monetary coordination.
First, does the creation of the EMI on 1 January 1994 generate any
realistic expectations that its working methods and efficiency will
become visibly different from those of its predecessor(s), the
Committee of Governors (and the Board of the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund, EMCF) ?
Ever since the Intergovernmental Conference decided, shortly before
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, that the new institution should
not be vested with any major new authority and that the name EMI
should be given to it in order not to confuse it with the powerful
24successor institution in stage three, the European Central Bank (ECB),
the tendency of most national officials has been to emphasize the
extent to which the EMI should be seen as simply a continuation of
the Committee of Governors.
There can be no doubt that there was a major scaling-down of the
new institutional framework for the transition from the time of the
Delors Report of 1989 until the signing of Maastricht. The Delors
Report envisaged the new central banking structure as evolving in a
gradualist way from the start of stage two with the set up of the ECB
as the most important feature of the stage. The Delors Report
recognized the difficulties of organizing a gradual transfer of decision-
making power from national authorities to a Community institution at
a time when "the ultimate responsibility for monetary policy decisions
would remain with the national authorities" (italics added).
1
6 This
formulation seemed natural in view of two facts: (1) realignments had
not been ruled out in stage two, and (2) Member States were not
obliged to give independence to their national central banks before the
end of stage two. This did not prevent the Delors Report from
proposing a number of important innovations, including the pooling
of part of foreign exchange reserves in the new institution and firm
ex ante guidelines for national monetary policies. The language in
recent pronouncements by officials is substantially more guarded; the
new EMI President also spoke in his statement quoted above of the
need to avoid " infringing on national monetary policy autonomy". The
slippage in the whole concept is evident. Yet it could be a mistake to
1
6 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (1989),
Art. 57.
25regard the EMI as simply a consultative body continuing the informal
coordinating efforts of its predecessor, the Committee of Governors.
In particular, the initiative will shift. The nomination of a President
of the EMI who is not one of the Governors and therefore unlikely to
feel bound to aim for the lowest common denominator of current
views among his colleagues will mark a change. The three Presidents
of the Committee of Governors during stage one, Mssrs Pohl,
Hoffmeyer and Duisenberg, have all come from the more cautious of
the EMS participants which should make the change more visible. It
would be appropriate, if not only the EMI Council, but also the
bodies preparing its work - the Committee of Alternates (typically the
Deputy Governors), and the numerous sub-committees and working
groups - were to be presided over by officials of the EMI rather than
by national representatives. This step, feasible only when the EMI
staff has been nominated over the next few months, would assure a
tighter work plan, a more coordinated effort and less defensiveness in
the surveillance of national monetary policies. One wonders whether
other international organizations would long survive a working
method where the discussion of individual country situations and
policies is based primarily on oral presentations by the individual
countries or by their contributions to written documents. The EMI
must, as do other organizations, make use of the services of its own
staff for setting the agenda and not simply for providing a forum for
meetings. The presence in the EMI as it moves to its new site in
Frankfurt in the course of 1994 of a growing professional staff with
the task of looking systematically at the common interest with the
appeasement of national views only a subsidiary consideration, will
26make a qualitative difference. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly,
there appears to be resistance from some participants to this type of
evolution.
The Council of the EMI will have more scope for coordinating
policies efficiently than the Committee of Governors, also because
several Member States have not stuck to the cautious line they took
in the Maastricht negotiations on one important issue. They have
proceeded to give autonomy to their respective national central banks
earlier than they envisaged two years ago, as exemplified by the
legislation recently enacted to give autonomy to Banque de France and
the changes introduced in 1992-93 in Italy and Spain. In its exercise
of collective responsibilities the EMI Council is already endowed with
more independence of the political authorities than its predecessor.
The Maastricht Treaty and the EMI Statute state explicitly:
 1
7
".. .the Council of the EMI may not seek or take any instructions
from Community institutions or bodies or governments or
Member States. The Community institutions or bodies as well
as the governments of the Member States undertake to respect
this principle and not to seek to influence the Council of the
EMI in the performance of its tasks."
This is a foretaste of the independent authority to be vested in the
Governing Council of the ECB from the start of stage three. These
provisions take on special significance in the perspective of the text
of Art. 109 f, 4. of the Maastricht Treaty which confers upon the
1
7 Protocol on the EMI Statute, Art. 8.
27EMI Council the right to formulate by a qualified majority, i.e.
presently nine of its 13 members, opinions and recommendations not
only on the overall orientation of monetary policy and the functioning
of the EMS, but also on the conduct of policy in a Member State. It
is hard to believe that such opinions and recommendations coming
from a significant majority of increasingly independent central banks
and prepared by the professional analysis of the EMI will fail to have
an impact on the policies of those to whom they are addressed.
Whether monetary policy is during stage two to be only "ultimately",
or more or less fully, in national hands, these provisions introduce an
element of collective responsibility which is new. This conclusion
holds whether the EMI will be acting in the framework of the present
wide fluctuation margins or after a return to narrow margins. In the
wide margins the EMI Council would no doubt find use for the
provisions of Article 103, 4 of the Maastricht Treaty in reinforcing
tight multilateral surveillance of a country which pays inadequate
attention to its exchange rate.
Second, to what extent can the EMI take on new operational tasks and
what difference would it make ?
The Maastricht Treaty and the EMI Statute contain one potentially
significant operational role for the EMI, which may "hold and manage
foreign exchange reserves as an agent for and at the request of
national central banks."
1
8 This role will be determined by the
readiness of individual central banks to set up the appropriate
contractual framework and it is subject to the proviso that the
1
8 Protocol of the EMI Statute, Art. 6.4.
28resulting transactions "shall not interfere with the monetary policy and
exchange rate policy of the competent monetary authority of any
Member State and shall be consistent with the objectives of the EMI




It is reportedly uncertain at the present time how many countries
would be prepared to let the EMI become its agent in foreign
exchange management and what the significance of the provision
could be in the environment of wide margins in the EMS. Some
countries are apparently even contesting whether the wording "hold
and manage" applies to foreign exchange interventions or only to
more passive management functions, and whether the agent function
applies to all foreign exchange holdings or should exclude EMS-
currencies. If confined to non-EMS currencies and to passive
management of assets, the provision would, indeed, become rather
meaningless.
Some pooling of operational activity in joint-owned institution early
in the EMU process was proposed by none other than the current
EMI President in one of his contributions to the Delors Committee.
2
0
He proposed a common operational facility incorporating all of the
foreign exchange and domestic market activities of the national central
banks. This was seen to have several advantages: (1) it would make




29participants; perhaps surprisingly to outsiders, this has not been the
case up to now, except for interventions proper which are monitored
through the telephonic concertations, or bilaterally in the case of
intramarginal interventions, and recorded in the books of the EMCF
(now transformed into the EMI); (2) it would permit a common
appearance in the markets, since private market participants would be
unable to determine the source of instructions for operations from the
jointly owned institution; the proposal would thereby shift the
informational advantages clearly in favour of the authorities; (3) it
would provide a more efficient training ground for national foreign
exchange and money market operators during secondment to the joint
operational centre than ad hoc concertations of interventions provide
today, hence improving the preparations for the final stage; (4) it
would provide some scope for cost savings through centralization in
analogy to what commercial banks achieve by organizing their foreign
exchange and money market operations efficiently in one location.
Despite these strong arguments the Lamfalussy proposal never won
much favour among central bankers in the Delors Committee or
among the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty. Some found it too
minimalist; France proposed outright pooling of foreign exchange in
stage two - or even in stage one - while others wanted to assign to the
new institution more definitive authority over an important domestic
policy instrument (reserve requirements), hence fore- shadowing the
use of a common instrument in stage three.
2
1 Most central bankers
and other national officials were critical of the proposal, maybe
2
1 For a more detailed discussion, see Gros and Thygesen (1992), pp. 363
ss. or Bini-Smaghi, Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia (1993).
30because they were preoccupied less with the transitional stage two
than with the emerging detailed blueprint for the final stage of full
monetary union with an ECB combining centralized decision-making
with decentralized implementation of policy. The idea of early
centralization of some or all operations did not fit in very well. In the
end, only the voluntary bilateral pooling of foreign exchange
operations by individual central banks survived and even that more
modest step is still subject to criticism and suspicion from the
Bundesbank. The Germans have clearly indicated that they do not
intend to make use of this provision and they are apparently trying to
discourage others from entering into bilateral contracts with the EMI.
In the meantime the move to wide margins has made the pooling of
foreign exchange management, even if including interventions in the
EMS-currencies, look out of date, since the very purpose of wide
margins is to minimize reliance on interventions.
It is an important task for the EMI - which will come naturally to its
President who provided the original inspiration on the subject - to
reflect on the present usefulness of this approach. If several central
banks show an interest and the joint operational activities are not too
severely circumscribed by the exclusion of the management of assets
in the EMS currencies and of interventions, some pooling of
operations could still be worth pursuing for the reasons mentioned,
even though the environment has changed. The purpose has now
become primarily forward-looking rather than to provide an element
of a common policy for stage two. If the new environment of the
wide margins persists throughout stage two, the pooling of operations
ought, in this author's view, to be extended, as envisaged in the
31original Lamfalussy proposal, also to domestic money market
operations.
Art. 109 f, 7 in the Maastricht Treaty and Art. 7.2 in the EMI
Statute open the possibility that the EMI may perform tasks for the
preparation of stage three in addition to those currently listed, if such
tasks are conferred upon it by the Council, acting unanimously on a
recommendation from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament and the EMI. There would appear to be good
arguments in favour of seeking the assignment of (a significant part
of) domestic money market operations to the EMI to underpin its
effort to prepare for the future joint policy with a positive feed-back
on stage two itself. As argued above, with the wide margins the
EMI's task of coordinating monetary policy shifts from the more
mechanical rule book of the narrow margins EMS towards the
monitoring of the consistency of national monetary management and
of the methods by which the individual central banks exercise
domestic monetary control through operations in their respective
money markets. Familiarity with these operations thereby becomes a
more important asset also in a current perspective. Assigning an
operational role to the EMI in this area would greatly enhance the
authority of the new institution.
Third, the EMI is entrusted with the tasks of facilitating the use of the
ecu and overseeing its development, including the smooth functioning
of the ecu clearing system.
Here again the EMI is faced with more of an uphill fight than was
32foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty. The ecu remains the prospective
future single currency in EMU, but the importance of this quality has,
for the time being at least, in view of most observers receded further
into the future while becoming more uncertain. The pressure from
market participants to anticipate the use of the future single currency
by making rapidly increasing use of the unit during stage two - which
could have become almost the major task confronting the EMI in
circumstances more favourable to rapid realization of full EMU - has
accordingly weakened. In the present very flexible EMS and with two
major currencies, representing one fourth of the basket, still floating,
the ecu has reverted to its earlier role as a potentially useful hedge
against fluctuations in individual currencies, which may still be
enough to spur some further growth in its use, but not any qualitative
change. In any case, the hostility of the Bundesbank to any form of
encouragement of the evolution of the ecu appears to have increased;
most governments, including those of the United Kingdom and
France, continue to use the unit in their bond issues and clearly take
a much greater interest in the smooth development and growth of the
market.
Apart from the provision of statistics and current analysis of trends in
the ecu markets, including that the unit is, at a minimum, treated on
a par with foreign currencies and not discriminated against in the
legislation or administration of Member States, the main issue for the
EMI would appear to be whether it could - and should - take over
from the BIS the settlement function in the clearing system. For a few
years the BIS has been acting as agent for the Ecu Banking
Association in this capacity.
33To an outsider, it would seem natural for the EMI to take over this
function and to begin considering whether some overnight credit
element should be introduced in the functioning of the clearing system
as has earlier been proposed by some central banks. The Treaty is
silent on the feasibility of such a step; it does not list the task among
those of the EMI, but nor does it exclude it. If there is opposition to
the EMI taking on this task, recourse might be tried, as was the case
for the pooling of domestic monetary operations, to Art. 109 f, 7 of
the Treaty. But a first line of approach would be to argue that the
clearing function belongs naturally among the tasks of the EMI
without the need for any further explicit authorization.
Fourth, the EMI has the main role of preparing the framework for
conducting a single monetary policy in stage three. This covers the
design of a strategy for intermediate objectives, notably the role of
monetary aggregates (or possibly nominal income) in achieving the
primary objective of price stability, the operating procedures and the
policy instruments, as well as the more pedestrian, but essential
preparatory steps in the area of payments, accounting and information
systems and the production and distribution of ecu banknotes. Most
of these preparations are progressing steadily in the framework of the
various subgroups set up by the Committee of Governors, but work
may need to be accelerated in order for "the regulatory,
organizational and logistical framework necessary for the ESCB to
perform its tasks in the third stage"
2
2 to be ready before the end of
1996.
2
2 Art. 109 f, 3 of the Maastricht Treaty.
34The main test is the design of the joint policy itself. With stage three
building on a "national" vision of monetary policy jointly for all
participants, rather than on a further intensification of coordination of
national monetary policies
23, it was always questionable to what
extent studying the design of the future environment could teach
something of ready relevance for stage two. The transition to wide
margins has not basically changed this perspective. The aggregation
of harmonized national monetary aggregates into a single measure
may, however have become even more complex in view of the
transition to wide margins which must be presumed once more to
have modified the degree of substitutability of national monies. A
good deal of solid analytical effort is required here, but no conclusive
results should be expected. Improvisation and flexibility will still be
required in stage three.
2
3 This qualitative jump which became clarified in the Delors Report is
illustratively discussed in Bini-Smaghi, Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia
(1993).
35IV. Conclusions.
The present paper on reinforcing stage two of the EMU process has
ranged widely. Section II asked a number of questions regarding the
macroeconomic and monetary environment likely to prevail in stage
two, and more specifically, whether it is desirable and feasible to
return to the narrow margins within a shorter time span of a year or
so. Starting from a very demanding list of non-monetary prerequisites
for such a step, established recently by the new EMI President, the
discussion centered on the type of reinforcements of the EMS which
would be useful in reviving the system. Removal of doubts as to the
extent of intervention commitments, and mechanisms to assure a more
rapid escalation in the use of the defensive mechanisms of the Basle-
Nyborg Agreement than could be observed in the prolonged turmoil
of 1992-93, given the traumatic experience of the past year, will be
the main determinants of whether a narrow margins EMS could once
more become a stable framework. However, unless it became clear
that its future participants had convincingly renounced the use of
realignments for the future such a return could still be regarded as
risky.
Given the demanding non-monetary and monetary prerequisites for
going back to narrow margins and the, so far, relatively smooth
operations of the wide margins introduced on 1 August 1993, one has
to consider the implications of continuing the present arrangements,
not just for a brief transitional period, but throughout stage two. A
recent, but still tentative conclusion is that - provided Member States
continue to use their enlarged room for manoeuvre with caution, in
36order to maintain their promising degree of nominal convergence, and
hence the long-run credibility of their central rates - such a scenario
may yield satisfactory results not only as far as current policies are
concerned but also a route to EMU, alternative to the straight path via
a reintroduction of narrow margins. One point, sometimes overlooked
in the debate is that countries would not disqualify themselves from
qualifying for EMU simply by maintaining their currencies in the
wide margins, since the latter have now become "normal" in the sense
of the Maastricht Treaty.
Section III went on to ask in which ways the set up of the European
Monetary Institute (EMI) at the start of stage two marks a qualitative
change and how the new institution could, within the framework of
the Maastricht Treaty, reinforce monetary coordination. One useful
element is the change in working habits with more of the input,
initiative and responsibility for implementation in the hands of the
EMI President and his full-time staff rather than of the more
defensive national central banks. The Maastricht Treaty and the EMI
Statute assigns a potential role to the new institution in the holding
and management of foreign exchange reserves. Although such a role
is less important under the wide margins EMS than it would have
been under the arrangements expected to prevail when the Treaty was
drafted, this limited operational role is potentially useful, particularly
in a forward-looking perspective and it ought to be used and not
circumscribed by restrictions of various kinds of the EMI's
capabilities. The possibility of extending an operational function for
the EMI as an agent for national central banks in their domestic
money market operations could be explored along the lines originally
37proposed in the Delors Report by Professor Lamfalussy. The EMI
also would appear to have a natural role to play as the settlement
agent in the ecu banking market; this function should be transferred
to it from the BIS and extended in the direction of a limited lender-of-
last-resort function for the ecu banking market. With much of the
incentive to anticipate the future role of the ecu as the single currency
sometime after the start of stage three gone because of the increased
uncertainty surrounding the realization of EMU according to the
Maastricht timetable, the EMI will, also in this area, have less to do
than was planned for.
The task of preparing in detail for the third stage has, however,
become more demanding than ever and will in any case leave the new
institution with a crowded agenda.
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